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11) Смысловое (логическое) развитие – использование вместо данного элемента дей-
ствительности другого, находящегося с первым в отношении неразрывной связи. Прак-
тически речь идет о заменах в рамках отношений: причина– следствие, процесс (дей-
ствие) – результат, субъект деятельности – инструмент – продукт деятельности, предмет 
– его функция – его свойство и т.п.: 
Klein– und Mittelbauern geraten in die Abhängigkeit der Industrieunternehmen. Мелкие 
и средние крестьянские хозяйства  попадают в зависимость от промышленных фирм. 
12) Антонимический перевод через антоним ключевого слова при одновременном до-
бавлении или снятии отрицания: 
oft нередко (добавление отрицания к антониму) 
eine offene Agression неприкрытая агрессия 
13) Конверсивная замена – замена данного отношения элементов описываемой ситуа-
ции на противоположное. Такая замена обычно осуществляется путем использования со-
ответствующих слов–конверсивов, изменения порядка слов и синтаксической функции 
слов в предложении: 
Gold ist teurer als Silber  Серебро дешевле золота ("дешевле" –  "дороже", изменен по-
рядок слов). 
Wir stehen vor der gleichen Aufgabe.Перед нами стоит та же задача. 
14) Целостное преобразование – конкретное изменение способа описания ситуации, 
замена образа, включающие в себя несколько трудно разграничиваемых трансформаций. 
Die Firma steht gegenwärtig auf der Kippe.  Эта фирма находится сейчас накануне 
краха. (Букв.: "...стоит на острие".) 
Итак, применение лексико–семантических переводческих трансформаций обеспечива-
ет большую степень эквивалентности. Основными мотивами применения трансформаций 
является стремление избежать нарушения норм сочетаемости единиц в языке перевода, 
необходимость преодоления межъязыковых различий, стремление избежать чуждых рус-
скому языку словообразовательных моделей, а также стремление донести до слушателя 
важную фоновую информацию или снять избыточную, а также стремление  к более ком-
пактному варианту перевода.  
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Abstract. The concept of independent board members is an important part of the corporate 
governance landscape. Existing of this kind of directors should protect a company from bying 
exploited by managers or a majority shareholder. Regardless of the truth or false of this 
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Polish commerce code defines a typical structure of authority in joined-stock companies 
encompassing three levels of governing bodies with different types of powers. Such a structure 
in literature is called German model [6, 7]. In this model unlike in others (eg. Anglo-Saxon, 
Latin or Japanese) [6, 7] there is additional body between shareholders and board of directors По
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called supervisory board. The rationale behind the introduction of the supervisory board into the 
corporate governance system points the need to monitor the directors who shouldn’t be 
effectively controlled by shareholders having no time and knowledge to investigate and evaluate 
firm’s performances and activities. The supervisory board groups (or more precisly – should 
group) a number of professionals who act in behalf of and relieves shareholders in supervion 
task and constitutes a connection between shareholders and managing body. 
Polish system thus encompasses: 
1. Shareholders meeting that meets normally yearly to make some key decisions 
concerning dividends, changing the charter, issuing shares, electing supervisory board members 
and – if the charter states so – electing board of directors. 
2. Supervisory board – body monitoring the way a company is managed by the board of 
directors elected by shareholders  
3. Board of directors – nominated by shareholders or the supervisory board managing 
team that performs everyday activity of a company. 
Both general solutions: one-tier board characteristic to the Anglo-Saxon model and two-tier 
board existing in the German model suffer from the same mechanism – possible breach of 
duties by persons managing and monitorng the company. Because in two-tier board both 
boards’ members are elected – directly or indirectly – by the same persons (shareholders), the 
key question emerges: why the suprvisory board members should be more trustworthy than 
directors or managers? This question can be extended to another one: Who will monitor the 
monitor? As Gilson noted: „hiring yet another team merely recreats the problem one level 
removed” [5]. The problem with menagers breaking duty of loyalty and duty of care can not be 
effectively  solved by another and another level of monitoring team while they would be 
connected by source of power and election mode with controlled entity. 
This leads us to the concept of independent director – the term widely used in corporate 
governance literature and encountered in all models of corporate governance. Although there 
could be many terms assigned to someone generally called an independent director (the 
independent director, the outside diractor, the disinterested directtor) and even made the 
distinction between different types of directors [3], for the purpose of this paper we will not 
distinguish different types of „independent” directors. According to the rules published by KNF 
[8], independent board member’s key feature is „lack of direct and indirect links with the super-
vised institution, members of management and supervisory bodies, significant shareholders and 
their related entities”. Of course within this general definition many different types of require-
ments can be formulated. Typically we can expect independent director or supervisory board 
member can not have any personal or business relations to: (1) managing team members, (2) 
shareholders (especially big ones), and (3) cooperants. 
In banking sector the role of independent directors is exeptional: any none-ethical behaviour 
of bank officers can harm not only owners of a bank but also its clients and economy’s stability. 
Efficient monitoring performed by skilled and really independent board members can prevent a 
bank from being exploited by listed above entities and positively affect firms’ performances; 
although should doesn’t mean do [1, 2, 4]. 
Some Polish publicly traded banks list requirements concerning independent board members 
in their charters and establish the number of independent board members. Between 2006 and 
percentage of public banks having regulations assigned to independent board members in their 
charters increased from 28% to 75% (see table 1). Some of carters have regulation empowering 
a supervisory board or shareholders meeting to determine independece criteria for board 
members. Sometimes the charter invokes requirements given by other institutions. 
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Table 1 – Regulations concerning independent board members in the Polish public banks’ 
charters and bylaws 
 
Year 
Number of banks having 
requirements concerning 
independent board members 
in their charters 
Number of banks having 
requirements concerning 
independent board 
members in other 
documents 
Number of banks having 
no requirements 
concerning independent 
board members 
2006 4 0 10 
2009 5 2 8 
2017 5 4 3 
 
Six publicly traded Polish banks regulate area of independent booard members in different 
ways, but they use the coompositions of similar elements: 
1. The number (or percentage) of independent board members (eg. „at least 30 %”, or „at 
least 2 board members”) 
2. The party board members shoud be independent of (eg. Key managers, shareholders 
controllig specific share of votes) 
3. Forbidden relations to the party (eg. family relations, ownership,  
4. Time since the relations are forbidden (eg. 3 years prior to nomination to the board). 
Table 2 shows summarize of regulations concernning independent baoord members in Polish 
publicly traded banks in 2017. 
 
Table 2 – Characteristics of independence requirements in banks’ charters in 2017 
 
Relation 
with 
Type of forbidden relation Years prior to nomination 
(typically) 
Bank 
management 
board 
being a top-manager or employee of the 
bank or its affiliated entity 
 
3-5 years 
earns any form of salary  
being subordinated to the member of 
bank’s management board in any other 
company 
 
having business relations to 
management board member  
being in close personal relations with 
someone who is subordinated to the 
member of bank’s management board 
3 years 
Bank 
shareholders 
being a shareholder or a representative 
of a dominant entity 
 
having important relations to the bank’s 
shareholder having specific share in 
votes 
 
Bank 
cooperants 
having business relations to bank or its 
affiliated entity (including being the 
statutory auditor) 
1 -3 years 
Other Being a supervisory board member for 
12 years 
 
 
Within the last 11 years the average number of requirements concerning independent board 
members in Polish publicly traded banks increased by about 50%. In 2006 there was 4 to 8 
reuirements mainly from the group describing relations with shareholders and management 
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board members. In 2017 a range of requirements hesitates from 8 to 10 and the scope of 
concerns has been completed by relations with business partners.  
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